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1	  Introduction	  	   The	  term	  “experimental	  philosophy”	  has	  no	  standard	  or	  widely	  agreed	  upon	  definition,	  and	  recent	  writers	  have	  proposed	  very	  different	  accounts	  of	  how	  the	  term	  should	  be	  used	  (Knobe	  and	  Nichols	  2008;	  Alexander	  2012;	  Rose	  and	  Danks	  2013;	  Alfano	  and	  Loeb,	  2014;	  Knobe	  this	  volume).	  On	  the	  usage	  we	  prefer,	  the	  term	  has	  a	  broad	  extension	  and	  very	  fuzzy	  boundaries:	  experimental	  philosophy	  is	  empirical	  work	  undertaken	  with	  the	  goal	  of	  contributing	  to	  a	  philosophical	  debate,	  though	  of	  course	  that	  may	  not	  be	  the	  only	  goal.	  Sometimes	  people	  doing	  experimental	  philosophy	  conduct	  experiments,	  but	  sometimes	  they	  don’t.	  Philosophically	  motivated	  ethnography	  like	  Richard	  Brandt’s	  pioneering	  study	  of	  Hopi	  ethics	  (Brandt	  1954)	  and	  John	  Ladd’s	  study	  of	  the	  moral	  code	  of	  the	  Navaho	  (Ladd	  1957)	  certainly	  count	  as	  experimental	  philosophy,	  on	  our	  interpretation	  of	  the	  term.	  Indeed,	  we	  think	  that	  Brandt	  and	  Ladd	  have	  a	  good	  claim	  to	  being	  the	  first	  important	  contributors	  to	  contemporary	  experimental	  philosophy.	  Many	  experimental	  philosophers	  are	  philosophers	  by	  training	  and	  professional	  affiliation,	  but	  some	  of	  the	  best	  work	  in	  experimental	  philosophy	  has	  been	  done	  by	  people	  who	  do	  not	  have	  advanced	  degrees	  in	  philosophy	  and	  do	  not	  teach	  in	  philosophy	  departments.	  The	  work	  on	  altruism	  by	  the	  social	  psychologist	  Daniel	  Batson	  is,	  in	  our	  view,	  one	  of	  the	  very	  best	  examples	  of	  experimental	  philosophy	  to	  date	  (Batson	  1991;	  2011).	  	  	   During	  the	  last	  decade,	  the	  term	  “experimental	  philosophy”	  has	  often	  been	  used	  in	  a	  much	  more	  restricted	  way.	  On	  that	  more	  restricted	  interpretation,	  which	  we	  will	  adopt	  for	  the	  remainder	  of	  this	  chapter,	  experimental	  philosophy	  is	  the	  empirical	  investigation	  of	  philosophical	  intuitions,	  the	  factors	  that	  affect	  them,	  and	  the	  psychological	  and	  neurological	  mechanisms	  that	  underlie	  them.	  This	  characterization	  of	  experimental	  philosophy	  immediately	  raises	  a	  pair	  of	  questions:	  	  	   1.	  What	  are	  philosophical	  intuitions?	  	  	  	  	  2.	  Why	  do	  experimental	  philosophers	  want	  to	  study	  them	  using	  the	  methods	  of	  empirical	  science?	  	  	  Our	  goal	  in	  the	  remainder	  of	  this	  chapter	  will	  be	  to	  explore	  answers	  to	  these	  questions	  and	  explain	  how	  these	  answers	  link	  experimental	  philosophy	  to	  the	  philosophical	  tradition.	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2	  What	  Are	  Philosophical	  Intuitions?	  	   	  	   We’ll	  begin	  with	  the	  first	  question,	  around	  which	  a	  lively	  controversy	  has	  erupted,	  with	  different	  philosophers	  defending	  quite	  different	  accounts	  (Bealer	  1998;	  Goldman	  2007;	  Ludwig	  2007;	  Pust	  2000;	  Sosa	  2007a;	  Williamson	  2004;	  for	  a	  useful	  overview,	  see	  Alexander	  2012).	  We	  think	  that	  the	  best	  way	  to	  approach	  this	  question	  is	  to	  focus	  on	  paradigm	  cases	  –	  uncontroversial	  examples	  of	  the	  appeal	  to	  intuitions	  in	  philosophical	  argument.1	  Throughout	  the	  history	  of	  Western	  philosophy,	  episodes	  like	  the	  following	  have	  played	  an	  important	  role	  in	  philosophical	  argument.	  A	  philosopher	  describes	  a	  situation,	  sometimes	  real	  but	  more	  often	  imaginary,	  and	  asks	  whether	  some	  of	  the	  people	  or	  objects	  or	  events	  in	  the	  situation	  described	  have	  some	  philosophically	  interesting	  property	  or	  relation:	  	  	  
• Is	  the	  action	  described	  morally	  wrong?	  
• Does	  the	  person	  described	  know	  that	  she	  will	  not	  win	  the	  lottery?	  
• When	  the	  speaker	  in	  the	  story	  uses	  the	  word	  ‘water’	  does	  the	  word	  refer	  to	  H2O?	  
• Does	  the	  “Chinese	  Room”	  exhibit	  real	  intentionality?	  	  	  When	  things	  go	  well,	  both	  the	  philosopher	  and	  her	  audience	  will	  agree	  on	  an	  answer,	  with	  little	  or	  no	  conscious	  reflection,	  and	  they	  will	  take	  the	  answer	  to	  be	  obvious.	  The	  answer	  will	  then	  be	  used	  as	  evidence	  for	  or	  against	  some	  philosophical	  thesis.	  The	  mental	  states	  that	  underlie	  episodes	  of	  this	  sort	  are	  paradigm	  cases	  of	  philosophical	  intuitions.	  	  	   Examples	  of	  this	  strategy	  of	  argument	  can	  be	  found	  in	  the	  writings	  of	  many	  historically	  important	  philosophers.	  Here	  is	  a	  well-­‐known	  passage	  from	  Plato’s	  Republic	  in	  which	  Socrates	  uses	  the	  strategy	  in	  a	  conversation	  about	  the	  nature	  of	  justice.	  	   Well	  said,	  Cephalus,	  I	  replied:	  but	  as	  concerning	  justice,	  what	  is	  it?	  –	  to	  speak	  the	   truth	   and	   to	  pay	   your	  debts	   –	  no	  more	   than	   this?	  And	   even	   to	   this	   are	  there	  not	  exceptions?	  Suppose	  a	   friend	  when	   in	  his	   right	  mind	  has	  deposited	  
arms	  with	  me	  and	  he	  asks	  for	  them	  when	  he	  is	  not	  in	  his	  right	  mind,	  ought	  I	  to	  
give	  them	  back	  to	  him?	  No	  one	  would	  say	  that	  I	  ought	  or	  that	  I	  should	  be	  
right	  in	  doing	  so,	  any	  more	  than	  they	  would	  say	  that	  I	  ought	  always	  to	  
speak	  the	  truth	  to	  one	  who	  is	  in	  his	  condition.	  
	  You	  are	  quite	  right,	  he	  replied.	  	  But	  then,	  I	  said,	  speaking	  the	  truth	  and	  paying	  your	  debts	  is	  not	  a	  correct	  definition	  of	  justice.	  	  Quite	  correct,	  Socrates.	  (Plato,	  1892,	  I,	  131,	  595;	  italics	  &	  boldface	  added)	  	   	  	  	  In	  the	  italicized	  sentence,	  Socrates	  sets	  out	  the	  imaginary	  situation	  and	  poses	  a	  question	  about	  justice.	  In	  the	  following	  sentence	  (in	  boldface),	  he	  reports	  his	  own	  intuition	  and	  confidently	  asserts	  what	  contemporary	  philosophers	  typically	  assume,	  viz.	  that	  everyone	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who	  was	  confronted	  with	  the	  question	  would	  share	  his	  intuition.	  Cephalus	  reports	  the	  same	  intuition	  and	  agrees	  that	  the	  intuition	  would	  be	  shared	  by	  everyone.	  Then	  Socrates	  argues	  that	  the	  intuition	  shows	  that	  the	  account	  of	  justice	  that	  Cephalus	  has	  offered	  is	  mistaken.	  	  	   Lots	  of	  examples	  like	  this	  can	  be	  found	  in	  more	  recent	  philosophy;	  they	  are	  particularly	  abundant	  in	  many	  areas	  of	  contemporary	  “analytic”	  philosophy.	  Here	  is	  a	  very	  brief	  catalog:	  	  	   (1)	  In	  metaphysics,	  debates	  about	  personal	  identity	  still	  invoke	  intuitions	  about	  Locke’s	  famous	  example	  of	  the	  prince	  and	  the	  cobbler,	  along	  with	  a	  wide	  variety	  of	  more	  recent	  cases	  in	  which	  brains	  are	  transplanted,	  memories	  and	  whole	  bodies	  are	  duplicated,	  and	  people	  use	  Star	  Trek	  teletransporters.	  	  	  (2)	  In	  ethics,	  intuitions	  about	  wayward	  trollies,	  organ	  harvesting,	  Roman	  circuses,	  inquiring	  murderers,	  children	  drowning	  in	  bathtubs,	  violinists	  whose	  survival	  requires	  being	  connected	  to	  someone	  else	  for	  nine	  months,	  and	  a	  host	  of	  other	  cases	  fill	  the	  literature.	  	  	  (3)	  In	  discussions	  of	  free	  will,	  philosophers	  often	  invoke	  intuitions	  about	  people	  locked	  in	  prison	  cells,	  people	  with	  brain	  implants	  controlled	  by	  evil	  scientists,	  people	  who	  dislike	  their	  own	  desires	  and	  a	  variety	  of	  other	  cases.	  	  (4)	  In	  epistemology,	  appeal	  to	  intuitions	  about	  lottery	  cases,	  fake	  barn	  cases,	  stakes	  cases,	  and	  a	  seemingly	  endless	  variety	  of	  Gettier	  cases	  abound.	  	  (5)	  In	  the	  philosophy	  of	  language,	  philosophers	  rely	  on	  intuitions	  about	  sorites	  cases,	  Twin	  Earth	  cases,	  Gödel	  cases	  and	  arthritis	  cases,	  among	  many	  others.	  	  	  (6)	  Elsewhere	  in	  the	  philosophy	  of	  language,	  when	  working	  out	  the	  semantics	  of	  philosophically	  important	  expressions,	  intuitions	  about	  what	  a	  sentence	  entails	  (or	  does	  not	  entail)	  are	  crucial.	  For	  example,	  Donald	  Davidson	  (following	  Anthony	  Kenny)	  famously	  argued	  that	  we	  have	  the	  intuition	  that	  (i)	  “Jones	  buttered	  the	  toast	  in	  the	  bathroom	  with	  a	  knife	  at	  midnight”	  entails	  (ii)	  “Jones	  buttered	  the	  toast,”	  and	  that	  poses	  a	  problem	  for	  philosophers	  who	  would	  analyze	  (i)	  as	  containing	  a	  five	  place	  predicate	  (Davidson	  1967).	  	  	  (7)	  In	  the	  philosophy	  of	  mind,	  intuitions	  about	  inverted	  spectrums,	  zombies,	  Chinese	  Rooms,	  and	  Mary	  the	  neuroscientist	  who	  has	  never	  seen	  the	  color	  red	  are	  widely	  invoked.	  	  	  (8)	  In	  the	  philosophy	  of	  science,	  intuitions	  about	  explanation	  (the	  height	  of	  the	  flagpole	  explains	  the	  length	  of	  the	  shadow,	  but	  the	  length	  of	  the	  shadow	  does	  not	  explain	  the	  height	  of	  the	  flagpole)	  and	  confirmation	  (a	  black	  raven	  confirms	  the	  generalization	  that	  all	  ravens	  are	  black,	  but	  a	  white	  piece	  of	  chalk	  does	  not)	  play	  a	  central	  role	  in	  supporting	  or	  challenging	  theories	  of	  explanation	  and	  confirmation.	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  This	  list	  is,	  of	  course,	  far	  from	  complete.	  It	  would	  be	  an	  easy	  task	  to	  add	  dozens	  of	  additional	  examples.2	  	  	   What	  do	  the	  intuitions	  invoked	  in	  these	  examples	  have	  in	  common?	  As	  noted	  earlier,	  when	  things	  go	  well,	  people	  who	  are	  asked	  about	  these	  cases	  find	  themselves	  almost	  immediately	  disposed	  to	  offer	  an	  answer,	  though	  they	  are	  not	  consciously	  aware	  of	  engaging	  in	  any	  reasoning	  that	  leads	  them	  to	  that	  answer.	  We	  are	  inclined	  to	  think	  that	  this	  is	  all	  that	  these	  cases	  have	  in	  common.	  Thus	  we	  endorse	  a	  broadly	  inclusive	  account	  of	  philosophical	  intuition.	  On	  this	  point,	  we	  agree	  with	  Timothy	  Williamson,	  who	  maintains	  that	  more	  restrictive	  accounts	  of	  philosophical	  intuition	  will	  not	  reflect	  the	  way	  the	  term	  ‘intuition’	  is	  invoked	  in	  contemporary	  philosophy.	  	  	  Although	  we	  could	  decide	  to	  restrict	  the	  term	  ‘intuition’	  to	  states	  with	  some	  list	  of	  psychological	  or	  epistemological	  features,	  such	  a	  stipulation	  would	  not	  explain	   the	   more	   promiscuous	   role	   the	   term	   plays	   in	   the	   practice	   of	  philosophy.	  (Williamson	  2007,	  218)	  	  Of	  course,	  it	  could	  turn	  out	  that	  most	  or	  all	  of	  the	  mental	  states	  that	  philosophers	  have	  called	  ‘philosophical	  intuitions’	  share	  interesting	  psychological	  properties	  that	  can’t	  be	  detected	  without	  careful	  empirical	  work.	  But	  in	  an	  important	  recent	  paper,	  Jennifer	  Nado	  (2013a)	  argues	  that	  this	  is	  not	  the	  case.	  Nado	  reviews	  a	  growing	  body	  of	  scientific	  evidence	  suggesting	  that	  “the	  mental	  states	  which	  are	  generally	  assumed	  to	  fall	  under	  the	  category	  of	  ‘intuition’	  likely	  comprise	  a	  highly	  heterogeneous	  group;	  from	  the	  point	  of	  view	  of	  psychology	  or	  of	  neuroscience,	  in	  fact,	  ‘intuitions’	  appear	  to	  be	  generated	  by	  several	  fundamentally	  different	  sorts	  of	  mental	  processes.”	  If	  Nado	  is	  right,	  and	  we	  are	  inclined	  to	  think	  she	  is,	  then	  one	  of	  the	  debates	  that	  will	  be	  center	  stage	  in	  the	  pages	  to	  follow,	  which	  focuses	  on	  the	  reliability	  of	  philosophical	  intuitions	  and	  the	  appropriateness	  of	  using	  philosophical	  intuitions	  as	  evidence	  in	  support	  of	  philosophical	  theories,	  will	  have	  to	  be	  fine-­‐tuned	  in	  an	  important	  way.	  Rather	  than	  challenging,	  or	  defending,	  the	  epistemic	  status	  of	  most	  or	  all	  philosophical	  intuitions,	  we	  should	  be	  exploring	  the	  epistemic	  status	  of	  different	  sorts	  of	  philosophical	  intuitions	  that,	  according	  to	  our	  best	  psychology	  and	  neuroscience,	  are	  produced	  by	  different	  mental	  mechanisms.	  	  Some	  critics	  of	  experimental	  philosophy,	  notably	  Williamson,	  have	  suggested	  that	  experimental	  philosophers	  are	  committed	  to	  the	  view	  that	  intuitions	  form	  a	  “psychological	  kind”	  (Forthcoming).	  But	  we	  find	  little	  evidence	  that	  researchers	  who	  view	  themselves	  as	  engaged	  in	  experimental	  philosophy	  think	  that	  intuitions	  form	  a	  psychological	  kind	  or	  are	  the	  product	  or	  a	  “special	  faculty”	  (Williamson,	  2005,	  18,	  25).	  However,	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  faculty	  of	  intuition	  is	  endorsed	  by	  some	  of	  the	  critics	  of	  experimental	  philosophy,	  notably	  Hales	  (2012),	  and	  some	  defenders	  of	  the	  use	  of	  intuition	  as	  evidence	  in	  philosophy	  maintain	  that	  intuitions	  are	  a	  sui	  generis	  category	  of	  mental	  states	  (Bealer	  1998;	  2002).	  	  	  Many	  philosophers	  who	  propose	  restrictive	  accounts	  of	  philosophical	  intuition	  are	  not	  concerned	  that	  their	  characterization	  of	  intuition	  excludes	  mental	  states	  that	  other	  philosophers	  have	  called	  “intuitions.”	  Their	  goal	  is	  not	  to	  explain	  what	  Williamson	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describes	  as	  the	  “promiscuous”	  role	  that	  the	  term	  “intuition”	  plays	  in	  the	  practice	  of	  philosophy.	  Rather	  than	  trying	  to	  capture	  philosophical	  usage,	  typically	  those	  who	  offer	  restrictive	  accounts	  of	  intuition	  are	  trying	  to	  defend	  the	  use	  of	  intuitions	  as	  evidence	  in	  philosophy.	  In	  constructing	  their	  restrictive	  definitions	  of	  “intuition”	  they	  are	  trying	  to	  characterize	  those	  mental	  states	  that	  can	  legitimately	  be	  used	  as	  evidence	  in	  philosophical	  argumentation,	  and	  to	  exclude	  cases	  that	  they	  think	  should	  not	  be	  used,	  even	  if	  many	  philosophers	  would	  call	  those	  excluded	  cases	  “intuitions.”	  	  However,	  this	  is	  not	  the	  only	  motive	  for	  offering	  more	  restrictive	  accounts	  of	  intuition.	  As	  we	  noted	  earlier,	  Herman	  Cappelen	  tries	  to	  defend	  the	  view	  that	  philosophers	  
don’t	  use	  intuitions	  as	  evidence,	  and	  that	  the	  large	  number	  of	  philosophers	  who	  insist	  that	  they	  do	  are	  mistaken	  about	  their	  own	  practice.	  To	  make	  the	  case,	  Cappelen	  offers	  an	  account	  of	  intuitions	  that	  combines	  some	  of	  the	  most	  restrictive	  characterizations	  to	  be	  found	  in	  the	  literature,	  and	  then	  goes	  on	  to	  argue	  that	  intuitions	  characterized	  in	  that	  way	  are	  not	  used	  as	  evidence	  in	  philosophical	  argument.	  But	  since	  these	  restrictive	  characterizations	  impose	  what	  we	  take	  to	  be	  unreasonably	  demanding	  conditions	  on	  what	  is	  required	  for	  a	  judgment	  to	  be	  intuitive,	  Cappelen’s	  exercise	  gives	  us	  no	  reason	  at	  all	  to	  doubt	  that	  intuitions	  are	  used	  as	  evidence	  in	  the	  philosophical	  discussions	  alluded	  to	  in	  (1)	  –	  (8)	  or	  in	  the	  specific	  cases	  that	  Cappelen	  considers.	  Rather,	  as	  Michael	  Devitt	  (2014)	  has	  noted,	  Cappelen	  gets	  his	  singularly	  implausible	  conclusion	  by	  proposing	  an	  account	  of	  intuition	  based	  on	  theoretically	  motivated	  philosophical	  accounts	  of	  intuition,	  rather	  than	  by	  trying	  to	  characterize	  paradigm	  cases	  of	  what	  philosophers	  call	  “intuitions.”3	  	  	  	  Though	  this	  is	  not	  the	  place	  for	  a	  detailed	  critique	  of	  Cappelen’s	  overly	  restrictive	  account	  of	  intuition,	  or	  the	  role	  it	  plays	  in	  his	  polemical	  strategy,	  a	  single	  example	  may	  serve	  to	  illustrate	  the	  problem	  with	  his	  approach.	  As	  Cappelen	  rightly	  notes,	  a	  number	  of	  philosophers	  who	  defend	  the	  use	  of	  intuitions	  as	  evidence	  in	  philosophy	  maintain	  that	  “intuitive	  judgments	  must	  be	  based	  solely	  on	  conceptual	  competence.”	  (Cappelen	  2012,	  9)	  As	  an	  illustration,	  he	  quotes	  Ludwig	  (2010).	  	  It	   is	   only	   if	   a	   judgment	   is	   solely	   an	   expression	   of	   one’s	   competence	   in	   the	  contained	   concepts	   and	   their	   mode	   of	   combination	   that	   it	   counts	   as	   an	  apprehension	   of	   a	   conceptual	   or	   a	   priori	   truth.	   Insofar	   as	   we	   think	   of	  intuitions	  as	  insights	  into	  conceptual	  truths	  [as	  Ludwig	  does],	  they	  are	  to	  be	  conceived	  as	  judgments	  or	  beliefs	  which	  are	  the	  product	  of	  our	  competence	  in	  the	  deployment	  of	  the	  concepts	   involved.	  (Ludwig	  2010,	  433;	  material	   in	  brackets	  added	  by	  Cappelen)	  	  	  Another	  author	  cited	  by	  Cappelen	  is	  Sosa.	  Here’s	  how	  Sosa	  makes	  the	  point.	  	  	   I	  will	   presuppose	  …	   a	   conception	   of	   intuitions	   as	   intellectual	   seemings	   of	   a	  certain	  sort,	  as	  attractions	  to	  assent	  derived	  from	  the	  sheer	  understanding	  of	  the	  propositions	  involved.	  (Sosa,	  2007b)	  	  	  Though	  it	  is	  not	  entirely	  clear	  how	  these	  passages	  are	  to	  be	  interpreted,	  on	  what	  is	  perhaps	  the	  most	  natural	  reading,	  they	  entail	  that	  a	  judgment	  (or	  a	  belief	  or	  a	  seeming)	  that	  is	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influenced	  by	  factors	  other	  than	  conceptual	  competence	  or	  “sheer	  understanding	  of	  the	  propositions	  involved”	  will	  not	  count	  as	  an	  intuition.	  Among	  those	  factors,	  surely,	  are	  the	  order	  in	  which	  cases	  are	  presented,	  the	  messiness	  of	  the	  room	  in	  which	  the	  intuition	  is	  generated,	  and	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  person	  who	  has	  the	  intuition	  has	  recently	  used	  an	  antiseptic	  hand	  cleaner.	  But,	  as	  we	  will	  see	  in	  §3.2,	  all	  of	  these	  factors,	  and	  lots	  of	  others,	  have	  been	  shown	  to	  influence	  people’s	  responses	  to	  familiar	  philosophical	  thought	  experiments.	  Moreover,	  these	  influences	  are	  almost	  always	  covert	  –	  people	  have	  no	  awareness	  that	  their	  responses	  are	  being	  affected.	  To	  establish	  that	  these	  factors	  are	  influencing	  people’s	  judgments	  (or	  that	  they	  aren’t)	  requires	  well	  designed	  and	  carefully	  controlled	  experiments.	  So	  if	  the	  absence	  of	  influences	  like	  these	  is	  required	  for	  a	  judgment	  (or	  belief	  or	  seeming)	  to	  be	  an	  intuition,	  then	  we	  can’t	  tell	  whether	  or	  not	  intuitions	  are	  being	  used	  in	  ordinary	  philosophical	  dialogue	  without	  doing	  sophisticated	  experiments.	  And	  we	  certainly	  can’t	  show	  that	  intuitions	  were	  being	  utilized	  in	  the	  decades	  old	  philosophical	  discussions	  that	  Cappelen	  analyzes	  to	  make	  his	  case	  that	  philosophers	  do	  not	  rely	  on	  intuitions	  as	  evidence.	  But	  this	  casts	  no	  doubt	  at	  all	  on	  the	  widely	  held	  belief	  that	  intuitions	  do	  play	  an	  important	  role	  in	  philosophical	  argumentation.	  Rather,	  what	  it	  shows	  is	  that	  if	  one	  adopts	  an	  extremely	  demanding	  account	  of	  the	  conditions	  that	  a	  judgment	  must	  meet	  to	  qualify	  as	  an	  intuition,	  then	  it	  will	  be	  all	  but	  impossible	  to	  show	  that	  intuitions	  have	  been	  invoked	  in	  important	  philosophical	  exchanges.	  	   	  
3	  Why	  do	  experimental	  philosophers	  want	  to	  study	  philosophical	  intuitions	  using	  
the	  methods	  of	  empirical	  science?	  	  	  
3.1	  The	  Positive	  Program	  	  We	  turn	  now	  to	  the	  second	  question	  posed	  earlier.	  Broadly	  speaking,	  we	  think	  experimental	  philosophers	  can	  be	  divided	  into	  two	  clusters,	  and	  the	  people	  in	  these	  clusters	  answer	  this	  question	  in	  quite	  different	  ways.4	  One	  group,	  which	  was,	  and	  continues	  to	  be,	  inspired	  by	  the	  pioneering	  work	  of	  Joshua	  Knobe	  (2003;	  2005;	  2010),	  answers	  the	  question	  by	  noting	  that,	  in	  one	  guise	  or	  another,	  conceptual	  analysis	  has	  always	  played	  a	  central	  role	  in	  philosophy,	  and	  that	  intuitions	  are	  typically	  invoked	  as	  an	  important	  source	  of	  evidence	  for	  (or	  against)	  a	  proposed	  conceptual	  analysis.	  Why	  are	  intuitions	  useful	  as	  evidence	  in	  conceptual	  analysis?	  We	  think	  that	  many	  philosophers	  would	  endorse	  something	  like	  the	  answer	  proposed	  by	  Alvin	  Goldman.	  	   It’s	  part	  of	  the	  nature	  of	  concepts	  …	  that	  possessing	  a	  concept	  tends	  to	  give	  rise	  to	  beliefs	  and	  intuitions	  that	  accord	  with	  the	  contents	  of	  the	  concept.	  If	  the	   content	   of	   someone’s	   concept	   F	   implies	   that	   F	   does	   (doesn’t)	   apply	   to	  example	   x,	   then	   that	   person	   is	   disposed	   to	   intuit	   that	   F	   applies	   (doesn’t	  apply)	   to	   x	   when	   the	   issue	   is	   raised	   in	   his	   mind….	   [P]ossessing	   a	   concept	  makes	  one	  disposed	   to	  have	  pro-­‐intuitions	   toward	  correct	  applications	  and	  con-­‐intuitions	  toward	  incorrect	  applications	  —	  correct,	  that	  is,	  relative	  to	  the	  contents	  of	  the	  concept	  as	  it	  exists	  in	  the	  subject’s	  head.	  (Goldman	  2007,	  14-­‐15)5	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This	  account	  is	  quite	  similar	  to	  the	  standard	  account	  that	  Chomskian	  linguists	  offer	  for	  the	  use	  of	  linguistic	  intuitions	  in	  confirming	  or	  disconfirming	  a	  theory	  about	  the	  grammar	  of	  a	  person’s	  “I-­‐language”	  –	  the	  language	  whose	  grammar	  is	  actually	  represented	  in	  the	  person’s	  mind	  (Chomsky	  1986).6	  Linguistic	  intuitions	  about	  a	  sentence,	  Chomskians	  maintain,	  typically	  reflect	  what	  the	  speaker’s	  mentally	  represented	  grammar	  entails	  about	  the	  sentence.	  So,	  for	  example,	  if	  the	  grammar	  entails	  that	  the	  sentence	  is	  grammatical,	  speakers	  will	  be	  disposed	  to	  intuit	  that	  the	  sentence	  is	  acceptable,	  and	  if	  the	  grammar	  entails	  that	  the	  sentence	  is	  not	  grammatical,	  then	  speakers	  will	  be	  disposed	  to	  intuit	  that	  the	  sentence	  is	  not	  acceptable.	  However,	  as	  Chomsky	  and	  his	  followers	  have	  long	  noted,	  a	  speaker’s	  linguistic	  intuitions	  are	  not	  an	  infallible	  source	  of	  information	  about	  the	  grammar	  of	  the	  speaker’s	  I-­‐language.	  Failures	  of	  attention,	  limits	  of	  short	  term	  memory,	  and	  a	  variety	  of	  other	  factors	  can	  produce	  what	  Chomsky	  calls	  “performance	  errors”	  leading	  to	  linguistic	  intuitions	  that	  do	  not	  reflect	  the	  speaker’s	  underlying	  grammatical	  competence.	  Much	  the	  same	  can	  happen	  with	  philosophical	  intuitions.	  As	  Goldman	  points	  out,	  there	  are	  a	  number	  of	  ways	  in	  which	  “intuitions	  can	  go	  wrong.”	  For	  example,	  the	  person	  having	  the	  intuition	  may	  have	  a	  mistaken	  belief	  about	  some	  detail	  of	  the	  example,	  or	  she	  may	  “lose	  track	  of	  some	  features	  of	  the	  example	  while	  mentally	  computing	  the	  applicability	  of	  F	  to	  it.”	  For	  our	  purposes,	  however,	  the	  most	  interesting	  source	  of	  performance	  errors	  that	  Goldman	  mentions	  is	  that	  the	  person	  having	  the	  intuition	  “might	  have	  a	  false	  theory	  about	  her	  concept	  of	  F,	  and	  this	  theory	  may	  intrude	  when	  forming	  an	  application	  intuition”	  –	  i.e.	  an	  intuition	  about	  whether	  the	  concept	  applies	  to	  an	  example	  specified	  in	  a	  thought	  experiment	  (Ibid).	  As	  Goldman	  goes	  on	  to	  note,	  this	  is	  a	  danger	  to	  which	  philosophers	  are	  particularly	  vulnerable,	  since	  they	  have	  often	  have	  well	  elaborated	  theories	  about	  the	  concepts	  they	  are	  attempting	  to	  analyze.	  	   Knobe,	  and	  many	  experimental	  philosophers	  who	  have	  followed	  in	  his	  footsteps,	  in	  what	  has	  been	  dubbed	  “the	  positive	  program”	  7	  of	  experimental	  philosophy,	  are	  motivated	  to	  explore	  intuitions	  experimentally	  because	  they	  think	  that	  by	  doing	  so	  they	  can	  do	  a	  better	  job	  of	  conceptual	  analysis.	  They	  can	  avoid	  some	  of	  the	  idiosyncrasies,	  biases	  and	  performance	  errors	  that	  are	  likely	  to	  confront	  philosophers	  who	  attend	  only	  to	  their	  own	  intuitions	  and	  the	  intuitions	  of	  a	  few	  professional	  colleagues	  who	  read	  the	  same	  journals	  and	  who	  may	  have	  prior	  commitments	  to	  theories	  about	  the	  concepts	  under	  analysis.	  By	  collecting	  the	  intuitions	  of	  a	  substantial	  number	  of	  non-­‐philosophers,	  Knobe	  maintains,	  we	  may	  discover	  important	  facts	  about	  ordinary	  concepts	  that	  have	  gone	  unnoticed	  by	  philosophers	  using	  more	  traditional	  methods	  of	  conceptual	  analysis.	  	  	  Knobe’s	  own	  groundbreaking	  discovery	  of	  “the	  side-­‐effect	  effect”	  provides	  an	  excellent	  example	  of	  the	  way	  in	  which	  experimental	  philosophy	  can	  lead	  to	  unexpected	  discoveries	  about	  philosophically	  important	  concepts.	  Prior	  to	  Knobe’s	  work,	  there	  was	  a	  substantial	  philosophical	  literature	  aimed	  at	  analyzing	  the	  concept	  of	  intentional	  action.	  But	  the	  philosophers	  who	  contributed	  to	  that	  literature	  assumed	  that	  intentional	  action	  was	  a	  purely	  descriptive	  concept,	  and	  that	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  outcome	  of	  an	  action	  was	  intentional	  would	  depend	  entirely	  on	  the	  psychological	  states	  that	  led	  to	  the	  action.	  Knobe	  suspected	  that	  non-­‐philosophers’	  intuitions	  about	  foreseen	  side-­‐effects	  of	  actions	  would	  also	  be	  affected	  by	  the	  moral	  valence	  of	  the	  side-­‐effect,	  though	  philosophers	  might	  not	  have	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these	  intuitions	  because	  of	  the	  influence	  of	  philosophical	  theories	  in	  this	  area.	  To	  test	  his	  hypothesis,	  Knobe	  (2003)	  presented	  subjects	  with	  scenarios	  like	  the	  following:	  	  The	  vice-­‐president	  of	  a	  company	  went	  to	  the	  chairman	  of	  the	  board	  and	  said,	  “We	  are	  thinking	  of	  starting	  a	  new	  program.	  It	  will	  help	  us	   increase	  profits,	  but	  it	  will	  also	  harm	  the	  environment.”	  	  	  The	  chairman	  of	   the	  board	  answered,	  “I	  don’t	  care	  at	  all	  about	  harming	  the	  environment.	  I	  just	  want	  to	  make	  as	  much	  profit	  as	  I	  can.	  Let’s	  start	  the	  new	  program.”	  	  They	  started	  the	  new	  program.	  Sure	  enough,	  the	  environment	  was	  harmed.	  	  Another	  group	  of	  subjects	  was	  presented	  with	  the	  identical	  text,	  except	  that	  ‘harm’,	  ‘harming’	  and	  ‘harmed’	  were	  systematically	  replaced	  by	  ‘help,’	  ‘helping’	  and	  ‘helped.’	  In	  the	  harm	  case,	  participants	  were	  asked	  how	  much	  blame	  the	  chairman	  deserved	  (on	  a	  scale	  from	  0	  –	  6)	  and	  whether	  he	  intentionally	  harmed	  the	  environment.	  In	  the	  help	  case,	  participants	  were	  asked	  how	  much	  praise	  the	  chairman	  deserved	  (on	  a	  scale	  from	  0	  –	  6)	  and	  whether	  he	  intentionally	  helped	  the	  environment.	  The	  results,	  which	  have	  been	  replicated	  many	  times,	  were	  quite	  striking.	  In	  the	  harm	  case,	  82%	  said	  the	  chairman	  brought	  about	  the	  side-­‐effect	  intentionally.	  But	  in	  the	  help	  case,	  77%	  said	  the	  chairman	  did	  
not	  bring	  about	  the	  side-­‐effect	  intentionally.	  This	  remarkable	  finding	  has	  led	  to	  an	  on-­‐going	  debate	  about	  what	  factors	  are	  responsible	  for	  this	  effect	  (Adams	  and	  Steadman	  2004;	  Nadelhoffer	  2006;	  Nichols	  and	  Ulatowski	  2007;	  Alicke	  2008;	  Machery	  2008;	  Sripada	  2010).	  Though	  not	  everyone	  agrees,	  Knobe	  and	  many	  others	  think	  that	  the	  finding	  reflects	  a	  previously	  unsuspected	  feature	  of	  the	  ordinary	  concept	  of	  intentional	  action	  –	  a	  feature	  that	  had	  not	  been	  noticed	  by	  philosophers	  who	  relied	  on	  their	  own	  intuitions.8,	  9	  	  	   The	  take	  home	  message	  for	  this	  section	  of	  our	  paper	  is	  that	  the	  positive	  program	  in	  experimental	  philosophy	  shares	  the	  goal	  of	  the	  substantial	  part	  of	  traditional	  philosophy	  that	  is	  concerned	  with	  the	  analysis	  of	  important	  philosophical	  concepts.	  Moreover,	  the	  positive	  program	  and	  the	  philosophical	  tradition	  agree	  that	  intuitions	  about	  real	  and	  hypothetical	  cases	  provide	  an	  important,	  though	  defeasible	  source	  of	  evidence	  for	  conceptual	  analyses.	  Experiments	  are	  important	  because	  they	  can	  reveal	  features	  of	  philosophically	  important	  concepts	  –	  like	  the	  link	  between	  moral	  valance	  and	  the	  concept	  of	  intentional	  action	  –	  that,	  for	  one	  reason	  or	  another,	  philosophers	  have	  failed	  to	  notice.	  In	  principle,	  experiments	  can	  also	  be	  useful	  when	  philosophers	  disagree	  about	  cases.	  If	  most	  non-­‐philosophers’	  intuitions	  about	  the	  disputed	  cases	  coincide	  with	  the	  intuitions	  of	  one	  group	  of	  philosophers,	  then	  we	  have	  some	  reason	  to	  believe	  that	  the	  intuitions	  of	  the	  other	  group	  of	  philosophers	  –	  those	  who	  do	  not	  share	  the	  intuition	  of	  “the	  folk”	  –	  are	  performance	  errors,	  or	  that	  this	  group	  of	  philosophers	  do	  not	  share	  the	  concept	  that	  is	  guiding	  the	  intuitions	  of	  the	  folk	  and	  the	  other	  philosophers.	  This	  is	  a	  theme	  we	  will	  return	  to	  in	  section	  §3.2.10	  	  	   3.2	  The	  Negative	  Program	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   The	  second	  answer	  to	  the	  question:	  Why	  do	  experimental	  philosophers	  want	  to	  study	  
philosophical	  intuitions	  using	  the	  methods	  of	  empirical	  science?	  is	  provided	  by	  what	  is	  often	  called	  the	  “negative	  program.”	  The	  negative	  program	  has	  implications	  for	  philosophical	  projects	  whose	  goal	  is	  conceptual	  analysis,	  and	  we	  will	  attend	  to	  these	  at	  the	  end	  of	  this	  section.	  However,	  the	  negative	  program	  is	  best	  set	  out	  against	  the	  backdrop	  of	  a	  different	  account	  the	  philosophical	  goals	  that	  many	  philosophers	  are	  pursuing.	  The	  analysis	  of	  concepts	  has	  long	  played	  an	  important	  role	  in	  philosophy,	  and	  in	  the	  middle	  years	  of	  the	  20th	  century,	  some	  philosophers,	  influenced	  by	  Logical	  Positivism	  and	  “ordinary	  language	  philosophy,”	  held	  the	  view	  that	  this	  was	  the	  main	  job	  of	  philosophy.	  But	  many	  philosophers,	  both	  historical	  and	  contemporary,	  would	  reject	  this	  view.	  According	  to	  Ernest	  Sosa,	  for	  example,	  	  It	  is	  often	  claimed	  that	  analytic	  philosophy	  appeals	  to	  armchair	  intuitions	  in	  the	   service	   of	   “conceptual	   analysis.”	   But	   this	   is	   deplorably	  misleading.	   The	  use	  of	   intuitions	   in	  philosophy	  should	  not	  be	   tied	  exclusively	   to	   conceptual	  analysis.	   Consider	   some	   main	   subjects	   of	   prominent	   debate:	   utilitarian	  versus	   deontological	   theories	   in	   ethics,	   for	   example,	   or	   Rawls’s	   theory	   of	  justice	   in	   social	   and	   political	   philosophy,	   or	   the	   externalism/internalism	  debate	   in	   epistemology;	   and	   many	   others	   could	   be	   cited	   to	   similar	   effect.	  These	  are	  not	  controversies	  about	  the	  conceptual	  analysis	  of	  some	  concept.	  They	   seem	  moreover	   to	   be	   disputes	   about	   something	  more	   objective	   than	  just	   a	   description	   or	   analysis	   of	   our	   individual	   or	   shared	   concepts	   of	   the	  relevant	   phenomena.	   Yet	   they	   have	   been	   properly	   conducted	   in	   terms	   of	  hypothetical	   examples,	   and	   intuitions	   about	   these	   examples.	   The	   questions	  involved	  are	  about	  rightness,	  or	  justice,	  or	  epistemic	  justification.	  Some	  such	  questions	   concern	   an	   ethical	   or	   epistemic	   subject	  matter,	   and	   not	   just	   our	  corresponding	  concepts.	  (Sosa	  2007,	  100)	  	  Sosa	  is	  surely	  right	  that	  many	  analytic	  philosophers	  would	  reject	  the	  idea	  that	  philosophy	  is	  principally	  concerned	  with	  the	  analysis	  of	  concepts.	  Rather,	  they	  would	  insist,	  many	  epistemologists	  are	  concerned	  with	  the	  nature	  of	  knowledge	  –	  what	  knowledge	  is	  –	  not	  with	  some	  person’s	  or	  group’s	  concept	  of	  knowledge,	  that	  many	  moral	  and	  political	  philosophers	  are	  concerned	  with	  the	  nature	  of	  justice	  –	  what	  justice	  is	  –	  not	  with	  some	  person’s	  or	  group’s	  concept	  of	  justice,	  and	  so	  on	  for	  many	  other	  branches	  of	  philosophical	  inquiry.	  	  	   When	  intuitions	  are	  used	  in	  conceptual	  analysis,	  the	  usual	  assumption,	  as	  we	  saw	  in	  §3.1,	  is	  that	  our	  intuition	  about	  whether	  a	  concept	  applies	  to	  a	  particular	  case	  is	  good,	  though	  not	  infallible,	  evidence	  about	  whether	  our	  concept	  really	  does	  apply	  to	  the	  case.	  In	  conceptual	  analysis,	  as	  in	  linguistics,	  intuitions	  are	  used	  as	  evidence	  about	  the	  underlying	  psychological	  states	  that	  typically	  play	  a	  central	  role	  in	  causing	  the	  intuition.	  But	  when	  intuitions	  about	  hypothetical	  cases	  are	  used	  to	  study	  the	  nature	  of	  knowledge	  or	  justice,	  or	  the	  nature	  of	  causation	  or	  reference	  or	  intentionality,	  rather	  than	  some	  person’s	  or	  group’s	  concepts	  of	  these	  phenomena,	  philosophers	  typically	  make	  a	  very	  different	  assumption.	  They	  assume	  that	  the	  contents	  of	  philosophical	  intuitions	  are	  likely	  to	  be	  true.	  Thus,	  for	  example,	  it	  is	  assumed	  that	  if	  we	  have	  the	  intuition	  that	  the	  protagonist	  in	  a	  typical	  Gettier	  case	  does	  not	  know	  the	  specified	  proposition,	  p,	  then	  it	  is	  likely	  that	  a	  person	  in	  that	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situation	  does	  not	  know	  that	  p,	  and	  any	  theory	  about	  the	  nature	  of	  knowledge	  that	  entails	  the	  protagonist	  does	  know	  that	  p	  is	  challenged.	  Similarly,	  it	  is	  assumed	  that	  if	  our	  intuition	  in	  a	  “Magistrate	  and	  the	  Mob”	  case	  is	  that	  it	  is	  morally	  wrong	  for	  the	  magistrate	  to	  knowingly	  find	  the	  innocent	  man	  guilty	  in	  order	  to	  prevent	  a	  violent	  riot,	  then	  it	  probably	  is	  morally	  wrong,	  and	  a	  moral	  theory	  that	  entails	  that	  it	  is	  wrong	  would	  be	  supported.	  Some	  philosophers	  find	  these	  assumptions	  deeply	  puzzling.	  How,	  they	  ask,	  could	  intuition	  provide	  generally	  reliable	  information	  about	  knowledge	  or	  justice	  or	  causation?11	  But	  philosophers	  like	  Sosa	  and	  Hales,	  who	  defend	  the	  practice	  of	  using	  intuitions	  in	  this	  way,	  and	  the	  assumption	  on	  which	  it	  rests,	  maintain	  that	  we	  rely	  on	  a	  largely	  parallel	  assumption	  when	  we	  use	  perceptual	  evidence	  (Sosa	  2007;	  Hales	  2012).	  	   In	  the	  previous	  paragraph,	  we	  followed	  the	  ubiquitous	  practice	  of	  talking	  about	  “our”	  intuitions	  and	  what	  follows	  if	  “we”	  have	  a	  specified	  intuition,	  without	  ever	  saying	  who	  “we”	  are.	  The	  tacit	  assumption	  behind	  this	  practice	  seems	  to	  be	  that	  everyone	  (or	  almost	  everyone)	  will	  have	  the	  same	  intuitions.	  As	  we	  noted	  earlier,	  this	  is	  an	  assumption	  that	  goes	  all	  the	  way	  back	  to	  Plato.	  Socrates	  insists	  that	  “no	  one	  would	  say	  that	  I	  ought	  [to	  return	  the	  weapons]	  or	  that	  I	  should	  be	  right	  in	  doing	  so,	  any	  more	  than	  they	  would	  say	  that	  I	  ought	  always	  to	  speak	  the	  truth	  to	  one	  who	  is	  in	  his	  condition”	  (Plato	  1892;	  italics	  added).	  But	  it	  is	  an	  assumption	  about	  which	  some	  philosophers	  have	  long	  been	  suspicious.12	  Starting	  in	  the	  final	  decade	  of	  the	  20th	  century,	  the	  work	  of	  Richard	  Nisbett	  and	  other	  cultural	  psychologists	  demonstrated	  that	  there	  are	  important	  differences	  in	  the	  perception,	  memory	  and	  cognition	  of	  people	  in	  different	  cultures	  (Nisbett	  2003;	  Henrich,	  Heine,	  and	  Norenzayan	  2010;	  Heine	  2011).	  In	  light	  of	  these	  findings,	  it	  is	  hard	  to	  see	  why	  we	  should	  blithely	  assume	  that	  people	  in	  different	  cultures	  would	  share	  the	  same	  philosophical	  intuitions.	  The	  assumption	  seems	  to	  be	  making	  a	  bold	  empirical	  claim	  that	  is	  susceptible	  to	  empirical	  exploration.	  So	  in	  the	  last	  few	  years	  of	  the	  last	  century,	  a	  group	  of	  philosophers	  at	  Rutgers	  University	  decided	  to	  test	  the	  assumption	  (Weinberg,	  Nichols,	  and	  Stich	  2001;	  Nichols,	  Stich,	  and	  Weinberg	  2003;	  Machery	  et	  al.	  2004).	  These	  were	  among	  the	  earliest	  studies	  in	  experimental	  philosophy’s	  negative	  program,	  and	  many	  philosophers	  found	  the	  results	  quite	  unsettling.	  In	  some	  cases,	  it	  seemed,	  people	  with	  different	  cultural	  backgrounds	  had	  significantly	  different	  intuitions	  about	  standard	  philosophical	  thought	  experiments.	  If	  this	  is	  right,	  then	  it	  poses	  an	  important	  challenge	  to	  the	  use	  of	  intuitions	  that	  Sosa	  endorses	  in	  the	  passage	  quoted	  above.	  For,	  as	  Sosa	  himself	  noted,	  if	  one	  group	  of	  people	  have	  the	  intuition	  that	  (say)	  the	  protagonist	  in	  a	  Gettier	  case	  does	  know	  that	  p,	  and	  another	  group	  have	  the	  intuition	  that	  the	  protagonist	  does	  not	  know	  that	  p,	  then	  they	  can’t	  both	  be	  right.	  So	  without	  a	  well-­‐supported	  “theory	  of	  error”	  that	  explains	  why	  the	  people	  or	  cultures	  who	  disagree	  with	  us	  are	  mistaken,	  the	  finding	  of	  cultural	  or	  individual	  differences	  in	  philosophical	  intuition	  makes	  the	  assumption	  that	  “our”	  intuitions	  are	  very	  likely	  to	  be	  true	  more	  than	  a	  bit	  problematic	  (Sosa	  2007).	  	   During	  the	  last	  half	  decade	  experimental	  philosophers,	  along	  with	  a	  number	  of	  psychologists,	  have	  become	  increasingly	  interested	  the	  idea	  that	  there	  may	  be	  cultural	  differences	  in	  people’s	  intuitive	  responses	  to	  philosophically	  important	  thought	  experiments,	  and	  this	  has	  led	  to	  a	  growing	  body	  of	  experimental	  work	  that	  has	  also	  begun	  to	  explore	  differences	  in	  intuitions	  across	  a	  variety	  of	  other	  demographic	  categories,	  including	  gender,	  age,	  personality,	  academic	  affiliation,	  and	  native	  language	  (Abarbanell	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and	  Hauser	  2010;	  Ahlenius	  and	  Tännsjö,	  2012;	  Buckwalter	  and	  Stich	  2013;	  Colaço	  et	  al.	  2014;	  Costa	  et	  al.	  2014;	  Feltz	  and	  Cokely	  2009;	  Machery,	  Olivola,	  and	  De	  Blanc	  2009;	  Machery	  et	  al.	  under	  review;	  Nagel,	  San	  Juan,	  and	  Mar	  2013;	  Starmans	  and	  Friedman	  2103,	  2014;	  Turri	  2013;	  Vaesen,	  Peterson,	  and	  Van	  Bezooijen	  2013).	  Some	  of	  these	  studies	  report	  partially	  conflicting	  findings,	  most	  have	  small	  sample	  sizes,	  and	  some	  raise	  other	  methodological	  issues.13	  So	  at	  this	  point,	  we	  don’t	  think	  any	  firm	  conclusions	  can	  be	  drawn.	  What	  is	  clear	  is	  that	  if	  different	  demographic	  groups	  do	  indeed	  have	  substantially	  different	  intuitions	  about	  the	  sorts	  of	  hypothetical	  cases	  that	  philosophers	  rely	  on	  to	  test	  their	  theories,	  then	  the	  negative	  program	  in	  experimental	  philosophy	  will	  pose	  a	  major	  challenge	  to	  the	  traditional	  philosophical	  methodology	  that	  uses	  intuitions	  as	  evidence	  for	  conclusions	  about	  the	  nature	  of	  knowledge,	  justice,	  causation,	  reference	  and	  other	  philosophically	  important	  phenomena.	  	  	   Demographic	  differences	  have	  not	  been	  the	  only	  focus	  of	  work	  in	  the	  negative	  program.	  Other	  studies	  have	  found	  that	  the	  order	  in	  which	  questions	  are	  asked,	  philosophically	  insignificant	  differences	  in	  the	  wording	  of	  the	  question,	  and	  the	  physical	  circumstances	  in	  which	  the	  intuitions	  are	  solicited	  can	  all	  have	  an	  effect	  on	  the	  intuitions	  that	  people	  report.14	  All	  of	  this	  is	  bad	  news	  for	  the	  standard	  philosophical	  assumption	  that	  the	  contents	  of	  people’s	  intuitions	  are	  very	  likely	  to	  be	  true.	  As	  Walter	  Sinnott-­‐Armstrong	  has	  noted,	  in	  discussing	  order	  effects	  in	  moral	  intuitions,	  	  The	  truth	  about	  what	  is	  morally	  right	  or	  wrong	  in	  the	  cases	  did	  not	  vary	  with	  [the	   order	   in	   which	   they	   were	   presented].	   Hence	  moral	   [intuitions]	   fail	   to	  track	   the	   truth	  and	  are	  unreliable	   insofar	  as	   they	  are	   subject	   to	   such	  order	  effects.	  (Sinnott-­‐Armstrong	  2008,	  67)	  Thus	  far,	  our	  discussion	  of	  the	  negative	  program	  has	  focused	  on	  the	  use	  of	  intuitions	  in	  philosophical	  projects	  whose	  goal	  is	  not	  conceptual	  analysis.	  Before	  moving	  on,	  let’s	  briefly	  consider	  the	  implications	  of	  the	  negative	  program	  for	  philosophical	  projects	  whose	  goal	  is	  conceptual	  analysis.	  There	  is,	  we	  think,	  an	  important	  distinction	  between	  order	  effects,	  wording	  effects	  and	  effects	  of	  physical	  circumstances,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  demographic	  differences	  on	  the	  other.	  If	  there	  are	  order,	  wording	  or	  physical	  circumstance	  effects	  on	  people’s	  intuitions	  about	  philosophically	  important	  cases,	  this	  poses	  a	  serious	  problem	  for	  the	  conceptual	  analyst.	  For,	  as	  Goldman	  (2007)	  pointed	  out,	  conceptual	  analysis	  typically	  assumes	  that	  “[i]f	  the	  content	  of	  someone’s	  concept	  F	  implies	  that	  F	  does	  (doesn’t)	  apply	  to	  example	  x,	  then	  that	  person	  is	  disposed	  to	  intuit	  that	  F	  applies	  (doesn’t	  apply)	  to	  x	  when	  the	  issue	  is	  raised	  in	  his	  mind.”	  And	  if	  order,	  philosophically	  insignificant	  wording	  differences	  or	  physical	  circumstances	  have	  a	  substantial	  effect	  on	  whether	  people	  intuit	  that	  F	  applies	  to	  example	  x,	  then	  this	  assumption	  is	  mistaken.	  	  The	  situation	  is	  interestingly	  different	  for	  demographic	  differences.	  Though	  there	  is	  no	  shortage	  of	  disagreement	  about	  how	  concepts	  are	  to	  be	  individuated,	  on	  one	  influential	  view,	  demographic	  differences	  in	  intuitions	  about	  philosophically	  important	  cases	  would	  be	  good	  evidence	  that	  the	  two	  groups	  had	  different	  concepts.	  Here	  is	  how	  Frank	  Jackson	  makes	  the	  point.	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I	  have	  occasionally	  run	  across	  people	  who	  resolutely	  resist	  the	  Gettier	  cases.	  Sometimes	   it	   has	   seemed	   right	   to	   accuse	   them	   of	   confusion	   –	   they	   haven’t	  properly	  understood	  the	  cases	  …	  –	  but	  sometimes	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  they	  are	  not	  confused;	  what	  we	  then	  learn	  from	  the	  stand-­‐off	   is	  simply	  that	  they	  use	  the	  word	  ‘knowledge’	  to	  cover	  different	  cases	  from	  most	  of	  us.	  In	  these	  cases	  it	  is,	  it	  seems	  to	  me,	  misguided	  to	  accuse	  them	  of	  error	  (unless	  they	  go	  on	  to	  say	  that	  their	  concept	  of	  knowledge	  is	  ours).	  (Jackson	  1998,	  32)	  	  If	  it	  turns	  out	  that	  different	  demographic	  groups	  have	  different	  concepts	  of	  knowledge,	  or	  justice,	  or	  moral	  permissibility	  or	  causation,	  it	  would,	  we	  think,	  be	  a	  fascinating	  and	  important	  discovery.	  But	  it	  would	  not	  pose	  any	  major	  challenge	  to	  philosophers	  engaged	  in	  conceptual	  analysis.	  They	  would	  simply	  have	  to	  be	  more	  careful	  to	  say	  whose	  concepts	  they	  were	  analyzing.	  	  	  	   This	  is	  not	  quite	  the	  end	  of	  the	  story,	  however.	  For	  while	  some	  philosophers	  pursue	  conceptual	  analysis	  as	  an	  end	  in	  itself,	  others	  want	  to	  use	  the	  analyzed	  concepts	  in	  other	  philosophical	  projects.	  And	  here	  demographic	  variation	  poses	  a	  problem.	  If,	  for	  example,	  a	  philosopher	  proposes	  to	  use	  the	  concept	  of	  justice	  or	  knowledge	  in	  formulating	  a	  normative	  principle,	  and	  if	  the	  concept	  invoked	  is	  different	  in	  different	  demographic	  groups,	  then	  the	  philosopher	  must	  specify	  which	  version	  of	  the	  concept	  she	  is	  invoking	  in	  her	  normative	  principle.	  She	  must	  also	  be	  prepared	  to	  explain	  why	  that	  version	  of	  the	  concept	  is	  the	  right	  one	  to	  use.	  Why	  is	  your	  concept	  of	  knowledge	  or	  justice	  better,	  or	  more	  appropriate,	  than	  the	  version	  used	  by	  people	  in	  other	  groups?	  Underscoring	  the	  need	  to	  address	  questions	  like	  this	  is,	  we	  believe,	  one	  of	  the	  most	  valuable	  contributions	  of	  the	  negative	  program.	  	  	  	  
4	  The	  Expertise	  Defense	  	  	  	   There	  have	  been	  a	  number	  responses	  to	  the	  challenge	  posed	  by	  experimental	  philosophy’s	  negative	  program.	  In	  this	  final	  section,	  we	  will	  focus	  on	  the	  one	  that	  has	  probably	  received	  the	  most	  attention.	  Following	  the	  lead	  of	  other	  authors,	  we	  will	  call	  it	  “the	  expertise	  defense.”	  The	  core	  idea	  of	  this	  response	  is	  that	  the	  studies	  that	  putatively	  show	  that	  philosophical	  intuitions	  are	  significantly	  influenced	  by	  irrelevant	  factors	  like	  the	  order	  in	  which	  cases	  are	  presented,	  philosophically	  unimportant	  differences	  in	  the	  wording	  of	  the	  cases,	  or	  the	  physical	  circumstances	  in	  which	  the	  cases	  are	  presented	  pose	  no	  challenge	  to	  the	  philosophical	  practice	  of	  using	  intuitions	  as	  evidence,	  because	  the	  experiments	  are	  gathering	  data	  from	  the	  wrong	  participants.	  These	  studies	  typically	  collect	  data	  from	  students,	  or	  internet	  users,	  or	  people	  strolling	  in	  public	  parks.	  But,	  the	  expertise	  defense	  maintains,	  when	  practicing	  their	  craft,	  philosophers	  do	  not	  rely	  on	  the	  intuitions	  of	  ordinary	  folk.	  Rather,	  they	  rely	  on	  their	  own	  intuitions	  and	  those	  of	  other	  professional	  philosophers.	  And	  that,	  the	  response	  continues,	  is	  as	  it	  should	  be,	  because	  philosophers	  are	  
experts	  in	  understanding	  and	  generating	  intuitions	  about	  philosophical	  thought	  experiments.	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   It	  is	  important	  to	  keep	  in	  mind	  that	  the	  expertise	  defense	  is	  proposed	  as	  a	  response	  to	  the	  challenged	  posed	  by	  studies	  showing	  that	  the	  intuitions	  of	  ordinary	  folk	  are	  influenced	  by	  irrelevant	  factors	  like	  order,	  minor	  differences	  in	  wording,	  and	  physical	  circumstances.	  In	  order	  to	  respond	  to	  that	  challenge,	  it	  is	  not	  sufficient	  to	  argue	  that	  philosophers’	  intuitions	  about	  philosophical	  thought	  experiments	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  true	  than	  the	  intuitions	  of	  ordinary	  of	  ordinary	  folk	  –	  though	  to	  the	  best	  of	  our	  knowledge,	  that	  latter	  claim	  has	  never	  been	  plausibly	  defended.	  To	  address	  the	  irrelevant	  influences	  challenge,	  the	  expertise	  defense	  must	  argue	  that	  philosophers’	  intuitions	  are	  less	  likely	  to	  be	  subject	  to	  irrelevant	  influences.	  This	  point	  has	  been	  clearly	  recognized	  by	  authors	  on	  both	  sides	  of	  the	  debate.	  For	  example,	  Horvarth,	  who	  endorses	  the	  expertise	  defense,	  writes:	  	   Why	   should	   professional	   philosophers	   grant	   …	   that	   their	   own	   intuitions	  about	  hypothetical	  cases	  vary	  equally	  with	  irrelevant	  factors	  as	  those	  of	  the	  folk?	  Surely,	  no	  chess	  grandmaster,	  mathematician	  or	  physicist	  would	  grant	  anything	  remotely	  like	  that	  to	  an	  experimental	  psychologist.”	  (Horvath	  2010)	  	  And	  Nado,	  a	  critic	  of	  the	  expertise	  defense,	  makes	  the	  point	  this	  way:	  	   The	  “expertise	  defense”	  is	  a	  particular	  strategy	  for	  meeting	  the	  experimental	  challenge.	   The	   basic	   claim	   is	   that	   the	   proponents	   of	   the	   experimental	  challenge	   have	   illicitly	   assumed	   that	   the	   variation	   that	   has	   been	   found	   on	  untrained	   subjects	   will	   also	   hold	   for	   the	   intuitive	   judgments	   of	   trained,	  professional	   philosophers.	   On	   the	   contrary,	   the	   defenders	   claim,	   trained	  philosophers	  have	  special	  skills	  which	  will	  help	  them	  resist	  the	  problematic	  variation.”	  (Nado	  2013b)	  	  	   The	  challenge	  posed	  by	  the	  expertise	  defense	  is	  a	  reasonable	  one.	  It	  is	  surely	  possible	  that	  the	  intuitions	  of	  professional	  philosophers	  are	  much	  less	  susceptible	  to	  irrelevant	  influences	  than	  the	  intuitions	  of	  other	  people.	  But	  whether	  or	  not	  it	  is	  true	  is	  clearly	  an	  empirical	  question,	  and	  thus	  far	  the	  advocates	  of	  the	  expertise	  defense	  have	  offered	  no	  empirical	  evidence.	  Rather,	  they	  have	  supported	  their	  claim	  with	  speculation	  and	  analogies.	  Until	  recently,	  the	  critics	  of	  the	  expertise	  defense	  had	  not	  done	  much	  better.	  But	  in	  the	  last	  few	  years,	  several	  studies	  have	  appeared	  that	  were	  designed	  to	  test	  the	  claim	  that	  philosophers’	  intuitions	  exhibit	  less	  irrelevant	  variation	  than	  the	  intuitions	  of	  non-­‐philosophers.	  We	  will	  briefly	  consider	  three	  of	  these	  –	  the	  first	  looking	  at	  order	  effects,	  the	  second	  at	  a	  minor	  difference	  in	  wording,	  and	  the	  third	  focused	  on	  the	  physical	  circumstances	  in	  which	  intuitions	  are	  elicited.	  	  	   Eric	  Schwitzgebel	  and	  Fiery	  Cushman	  (2012),	  used	  an	  on	  line	  survey	  that	  required	  participants	  to	  make	  moral	  judgments	  about	  a	  collection	  of	  scenarios	  relevant	  to	  three	  topics	  that	  are	  widely	  discussed	  in	  the	  philosophical	  literature:	  the	  doctrine	  of	  double	  effect,	  the	  action–omission	  distinction,	  and	  the	  phenomenon	  of	  moral	  luck.	  They	  also	  asked	  participants	  questions	  designed	  to	  assess	  whether	  they	  endorsed	  moral	  principles	  related	  to	  each	  of	  these	  topics.	  The	  order	  in	  which	  the	  scenarios	  were	  presented	  to	  participants	  was	  varied.	  So,	  for	  example,	  some	  participants	  were	  presented	  with	  a	  “push”	  version	  of	  a	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trolley	  problem	  before	  being	  presented	  with	  a	  “switch”	  version,	  while	  other	  participants	  saw	  these	  scenarios	  in	  the	  opposite	  order.	  The	  participants	  included	  academic	  philosophers	  who	  had	  completed	  an	  MA	  or	  a	  PhD	  in	  philosophy	  (many	  of	  them,	  including	  91	  PhDs,	  reported	  ethics	  as	  an	  area	  of	  specialization	  or	  an	  area	  of	  competence),	  academics	  who	  were	  not	  philosophers,	  and	  people	  who	  were	  not	  academics.	  Not	  surprisingly,	  the	  non-­‐philosophers	  showed	  significant	  order	  effects	  for	  all	  three	  types	  of	  scenario.	  But	  what	  about	  the	  philosophers?	  Schwitzgebel	  and	  Cushman	  report	  that	  “in	  our	  summary	  measure	  of	  order	  effects	  across	  all	  scenario	  judgments,	  philosophers	  and	  ethics	  PhDs	  trended	  marginally	  higher	  than	  the	  comparison	  groups.”	  They	  go	  on	  to	  observe	  that	  “[i]t	  is	  particularly	  striking	  that	  philosophical	  expertise	  did	  not	  reduce	  order	  effects	  for	  cases	  intended	  to	  target	  the	  doctrine	  of	  double	  effect,	  the	  action-­‐omission	  distinction,	  and	  the	  principle	  of	  moral	  luck,	  given	  that	  these	  philosophical	  principles	  are	  widely	  discussed	  in	  terms	  of	  hypothetical	  scenario	  comparisons	  very	  much	  like	  those	  we	  presented	  to	  our	  participants.”	  (148)	  The	  results	  on	  the	  endorsement	  of	  moral	  principles	  were	  even	  more	  striking.	  “Aggregating	  across	  all	  three	  principles,	  we	  found	  a	  significant	  order	  effect	  on	  philosophers’	  endorsements	  of	  general	  moral	  principles	  that	  was	  three	  times	  larger	  than	  the	  corresponding,	  non-­‐significant	  effect	  for	  non-­‐philosophers.”	  (149)	  	  	  	   Let’s	  turn,	  now,	  to	  wording	  effects.	  Tobia	  et	  al.	  (2012)	  focused	  on	  an	  effect	  called	  the	  “actor/observer	  bias”	  that	  has	  been	  studied	  by	  a	  number	  of	  psychologists	  (Jones	  and	  Nisbett	  1971;	  Saulnier	  and	  Perlman,	  1981;	  Fielder	  et	  al.	  1995;	  Choi	  and	  Nisbett	  1998).	  This	  earlier	  work	  demonstrated	  that,	  in	  many	  cases,	  people	  will	  respond	  differently	  to	  scenarios	  depending	  on	  whether	  the	  scenario	  depicts	  the	  experimental	  participant	  as	  the	  actor	  or	  the	  observer.	  In	  their	  study,	  Tobia	  and	  colleagues	  borrowed	  the	  following	  well	  known	  scenario	  from	  Smart	  and	  Williams	  (1978,	  98).	  	  	   You	  find	  yourself	  in	  the	  central	  square	  of	  a	  small	  South	  American	  town.	  Tied	  up	  against	  the	  wall	  are	  twenty	  natives,	  most	  terrified,	  a	  few	  defiant,	  in	  front	  of	  them	  several	  armed	  men	  in	  uniform.	  A	  heavy	  man	  in	  a	  sweat	  stained	  khaki	  shirt	   turns	   out	   to	   be	   the	   captain	   in	   charge	   and,	   after	   a	   good	   deal	   of	  questioning	   which	   establishes	   that	   you	   got	   there	   by	   accident	   while	   on	   a	  botanical	   expedition,	   explains	   that	   the	   natives	   are	   a	   random	   group	   of	   the	  inhabitants	  who,	  after	  recent	  acts	  of	  protest	  against	  the	  government,	  are	  just	  about	  to	  be	  killed	  to	  remind	  the	  other	  possible	  protesters	  of	  the	  advantages	  of	   not	   protesting.	  However,	   since	   you	   are	   an	   honored	   visitor	   from	   another	  land,	  the	  captain	  is	  happy	  to	  offer	  you	  a	  guest’s	  privilege	  of	  killing	  one	  of	  the	  natives	   yourself.	   If	   you	   accept,	   then	   as	   a	   special	  mark	   of	   the	   occasion,	   the	  other	  natives	  will	  be	  let	  off.	  Of	  course,	  if	  you	  refuse,	  then	  there	  is	  no	  special	  occasion,	  and	  Pedro	  here	  will	  do	  what	  he	  was	  about	  to	  do	  when	  you	  arrived,	  and	  kill	  them	  all.	  With	  some	  desperate	  recollection	  of	  childhood	  fiction,	  you	  wonder	  whether	  if	  you	  got	  hold	  of	  the	  gun,	  you	  could	  hold	  the	  captain,	  Pedro	  and	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  soldiers	  at	  bay,	  but	  it	  is	  quite	  clear	  from	  the	  circumstances	  that	  nothing	  of	   that	  kind	   is	  going	  to	  work:	  any	  attempt	  at	   that	  sort	  of	   thing	  will	  mean	  that	  you	  will	  also	  be	  killed	  along	  with	  all	  of	  the	  natives.	  The	  men	  against	   the	  wall,	   and	   the	   other	   villagers,	   understand	   the	   situation,	   and	   are	  obviously	  begging	  you	  to	  accept.	  What	  should	  you	  do?	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  Half	  of	  the	  participants	  were	  presented	  with	  this	  text	  and	  asked:	  	   Do	  you	  think	  that	  in	  these	  circumstances	  you	  are	  morally	  obligated	  to	  shoot	  and	  kill	  the	  one	  native	  in	  order	  to	  save	  the	  others?	  	  In	  the	  scenario	  presented	  to	  the	  remainder	  of	  the	  participants,	  ‘you’	  was	  replaced	  with	  ‘Jim’	  and	  the	  necessary	  grammatical	  changes	  were	  made.	  Undergraduate	  participants	  showed	  a	  large	  actor-­‐observer	  effect:	  19%	  said	  the	  action	  was	  morally	  obligatory	  for	  themselves,	  while	  53%	  said	  it	  was	  morally	  obligatory	  for	  Jim.	  Professional	  philosophers	  also	  showed	  a	  large	  actor-­‐observer	  effect,	  though	  it	  was	  in	  the	  opposite	  direction!	  	  	   In	  another	  study,	  Tobia	  et	  al.	  (2013)	  looked	  at	  the	  effect	  of	  physical	  circumstances	  on	  the	  moral	  intuitions	  of	  philosophers	  and	  non-­‐philosophers.	  They	  borrowed	  some	  of	  the	  (slightly	  kinky)	  “purity	  violations”	  that	  had	  been	  used	  in	  an	  earlier	  study	  by	  Helzer	  and	  Pizarro	  (2011),	  such	  as:	  	   While	  house	  sitting	  for	  his	  grandmother,	  a	  man	  and	  his	  girlfriend	  have	  sex	  on	  his	  grandmother’s	  bed.	  	  	  Participants	  were	  asked	  to	  rate	  each	  action	  on	  a	  scale	  from	  1	  (“not	  at	  all	  wrong”)	  to	  7	  (“totally	  wrong”).	  Some	  participants	  were	  surveyed	  using	  questionnaires	  that	  had	  previously	  been	  sprayed	  with	  distilled	  water;	  others	  were	  surveyed	  using	  questionnaires	  that	  had	  been	  sprayed	  with	  Spring	  Waterfall	  Scent	  Lysol	  spray.	  All	  the	  questionnaires	  were	  left	  to	  dry	  before	  being	  used.	  The	  scent	  remaining	  on	  the	  Lysol	  questionnaires	  was	  very	  hard	  to	  notice.	  None	  of	  the	  participants	  made	  any	  mention	  of	  it.	  But	  the	  scent	  had	  a	  significant	  effect	  on	  the	  judgments	  of	  both	  student	  participants	  and	  professional	  philosophers.	  	  	  	   The	  expertise	  defense	  predicts	  that	  the	  intuitions	  of	  professional	  philosophers	  will	  be	  less	  susceptible	  to	  irrelevant	  influences	  than	  the	  intuitions	  of	  ordinary	  folk.	  In	  the	  three	  studies	  we	  reviewed	  in	  this	  section,	  that	  prediction	  is	  mistaken.	  More	  work	  is	  needed,	  of	  course,	  since	  any	  single	  study	  could	  be	  a	  fluke	  or	  outlier.	  But	  the	  empirical	  evidence	  against	  the	  expertise	  defense	  is	  growing.	  In	  addition	  to	  the	  three	  studies	  surveyed	  here,	  Knobe	  and	  Samuels	  (2013)	  report	  another	  order	  effect	  on	  philosophers’	  intuitions,	  Machery	  (2013)	  found	  an	  effect	  of	  disciplinary	  background	  between	  linguists	  and	  philosophers,	  Vaesen,	  Peterson,	  and	  Van	  Bezooijen	  (2013)	  found	  an	  effect	  of	  native	  language	  on	  philosophers’	  epistemic	  intuitions,	  Schulz,	  Cokely,	  and	  Feltz	  (2011)	  found	  an	  effect	  of	  personality	  on	  experts’	  free	  will	  intuitions,	  and	  Tobia	  and	  Stich	  (ms.)	  found	  an	  effect	  of	  font	  on	  philosophers’	  intuitions	  about	  knowledge.	  We	  encourage	  continued	  research	  bearing	  on	  questions	  and	  claims	  of	  expertise,	  but	  the	  evidence	  currently	  available	  gives	  us	  no	  reason	  to	  believe	  that	  philosophical	  training	  shields	  philosophers’	  intuitions	  from	  several	  irrelevant	  influences.	  If	  that’s	  right,	  then	  experimental	  philosophy	  poses	  a	  major	  challenge	  to	  one	  of	  the	  main	  sources	  of	  evidence	  that	  philosophers	  have	  relied	  on	  throughout	  the	  history	  of	  western	  philosophy.	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  1	  Perhaps	  it	  would	  be	  better	  to	  say	  “largely	  uncontroversial	  examples,”	  since	  in	  philosophy	  almost	  nothing	  is	  uncontroversial.	  	  	  In	  a	  recent	  book,	  Cappelen	  (2012)	  maintains	  that	  while	  many	  philosophers	  believe	  they	  use	  intuitions	  as	  an	  important	  source	  of	  evidence,	  they	  are	  mistaken	  about	  their	  own	  practice.	  	  We’ll	  return	  to	  Cappelen’s	  provocative	  view	  at	  the	  end	  of	  this	  section.	  	  The	  strategy	  of	  beginning	  with	  (largely)	  uncontroversial	  examples	  is	  endorsed	  by	  Anna-­‐Sara	  Malmgren	  in	  her	  insightful	  review	  of	  Cappelen’s	  book	  (Malmgren	  2013).	  	  2	  For	  more	  detailed	  discussions	  of	  the	  use	  of	  intuitions	  in	  philosophy,	  see	  Pust	  (2000),	  Ch.	  1,	  and	  Alexander	  (2012),	  Ch.1.	  	  	  	  3	  There	  is	  a	  growing	  consensus	  that	  Cappelen’s	  attempt	  to	  show	  that	  philosophers	  don’t	  really	  use	  intuitions	  as	  evidence	  is	  undermined	  by	  his	  implausibly	  restrictive	  characterization	  of	  intuitions.	  See,	  for	  example,	  Chalmers	  (2014),	  Malmgren	  (2013),	  and	  Weinberg	  (2014).	  	  	  4	  Two	  important	  caveats	  are	  in	  order	  here.	  First,	  some	  experimental	  philosophers	  fall	  in	  both	  clusters,	  since	  they	  are	  motivated	  by	  the	  positive	  program	  when	  studying	  some	  intuitions,	  and	  by	  the	  negative	  program	  (discussed	  below)	  when	  studying	  other	  intuitions.	  Second,	  as	  Sytsma	  and	  Machery	  (2013)	  and	  Sytsma	  and	  Livengood	  (forthcoming)	  have	  noted,	  there	  is	  a	  substantial	  body	  of	  work	  in	  experimental	  philosophy	  that	  is	  not	  motivated	  by	  either	  program.	  Those	  engaged	  in	  this	  work	  “are	  interested	  in	  intuitions	  for	  their	  own	  sake,	  finding	  them	  to	  be	  a	  worthy	  topic	  of	  philosophical	  investigation”	  (Sytsma	  and	  Livengood,	  Forthcoming,	  §3.4).	  	  5	  Goldman	  (2010,	  §9)	  notes	  that	  similar	  views	  are	  defended	  by	  Chalmers	  and	  Jackson	  (2001)	  and	  Ludwig	  (2007).	  	  	  6	  Jaakko	  Hintikka	  (1999)	  maintains	  that	  the	  term	  “intuition”	  was	  rarely	  used	  in	  20th	  century	  analytic	  philosophy	  until	  Chomsky	  and	  his	  followers	  popularized	  its	  use	  in	  linguistics.	  Andow	  (forthcoming)	  offers	  quantitative	  evidence	  that	  there	  was	  a	  dramatic	  increase	  in	  the	  use	  of	  the	  term	  in	  philosophy	  starting	  about	  1970.	  	  7	  The	  term	  “positive	  program,”	  and	  the	  term	  “negative	  program,”	  which	  we’ll	  encounter	  shortly,	  are	  widely	  used,	  though	  their	  provenance	  is	  unclear.	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  8	  An	  alternative	  hypothesis	  is	  that	  the	  side-­‐effect	  effect	  is	  itself	  a	  performance	  error,	  and	  that	  the	  intuitions	  of	  participants	  in	  these	  experiments	  do	  not	  tell	  us	  what	  their	  concept	  of	  intentional	  action	  actually	  says	  about	  some	  of	  these	  cases.	  See	  Alexander,	  Mallon,	  and	  Weinberg	  (2010)	  for	  a	  discussion	  of	  some	  of	  the	  problems	  encountered	  in	  the	  attempt	  to	  decide	  between	  these	  hypotheses.	  	  	  9	  A	  pair	  of	  papers	  by	  Eddy	  Nahmias	  and	  his	  colleagues	  (Nahmias	  et	  al.,	  2005,	  2006)	  provides	  another	  important	  example	  of	  the	  positive	  program.	  In	  the	  literature	  on	  free	  will,	  a	  number	  of	  philosophers	  report	  strongly	  incompatibilist	  intuitions	  –	  i.e.	  intuitions	  indicating	  that	  free	  will	  cannot	  exist	  in	  a	  determinist	  universe.	  However,	  Nahmias	  and	  colleagues	  have	  shown	  that	  non-­‐philosophers	  tend	  to	  have	  compatibilist	  intuitions	  –	  intuitions	  indicating	  that	  free	  will	  can	  exist	  in	  a	  determinist	  universe.	  This	  suggests	  that	  the	  incompatibilist	  intuitions	  of	  many	  philosophers	  may	  be	  theoretically	  driven	  performance	  errors	  of	  the	  sort	  that	  Goldman	  warned	  against.	  	  	  10	  In	  his	  paper	  in	  this	  volume,	  Knobe	  argues	  that	  for	  the	  last	  five	  years	  most	  of	  the	  empirical	  research	  in	  experimental	  philosophy	  has	  not	  been	  concerned	  with	  the	  analysis	  of	  philosophically	  important	  concepts,	  or	  with	  the	  sort	  of	  critique	  of	  philosophical	  methodology	  that	  will	  be	  center	  stage	  in	  §3.2.	  Rather,	  he	  maintains,	  “the	  vast	  majority	  of	  [recent]	  research	  is	  cognitive	  science.	  It	  consists	  of	  identifying	  surprising	  effects	  in	  people’s	  intuitions	  and	  explaining	  those	  effects	  in	  terms	  of	  underlying	  cognitive	  processes”	  (Knobe,	  this	  volume,	  §	  VIII).	  The	  lesson	  he	  draws	  from	  this	  is	  that	  “experimental	  philosophy	  is	  pursuing	  philosophical	  questions	  in	  a	  way	  that	  is	  genuinely	  new”	  (Ibid).	  This	  is	  not	  the	  place	  to	  debate	  Knobe’s	  account	  of	  recent	  work	  in	  experimental	  philosophy.	  But	  if	  his	  portrait	  is	  accurate,	  it	  invites	  an	  obvious	  challenge:	  Why	  is	  this	  work	  philosophy?	  Knobe’s	  contention	  that	  it	  is	  pursuing	  philosophical	  questions	  in	  a	  genuinely	  new	  way	  is	  not	  likely	  to	  satisfy	  those	  who	  pose	  this	  challenge,	  since	  he	  has	  not	  told	  us	  what	  these	  questions	  are,	  or	  why	  they	  should	  be	  viewed	  as	  philosophical	  questions.	  	  	  11	  For	  a	  particularly	  trenchant	  critique	  of	  this	  assumption,	  see	  Goldman	  (2007,	  7).	  	  	  12	  See,	  for	  example,	  Stich	  1988	  and	  1990.	  	  13	  For	  details,	  see	  Machery	  et	  al.	  (under	  review).	  	  	  14	  Liao	  et	  al.	  (2012)	  found	  people’s	  intuitions	  about	  trolley	  problems	  were	  affected	  by	  the	  order	  of	  the	  cases’	  presentation.	  Helzer	  and	  Pizarro	  (2011)	  found	  that	  people’s	  moral	  intuitions	  differed	  when	  they	  were	  in	  the	  presence	  of	  a	  hand-­‐sanitizer.	  Schnall	  et	  al.	  (2008)	  report	  that	  certain	  smells	  affected	  moral	  intuitions.	  We	  will	  discuss	  an	  example	  of	  a	  wording	  effect	  in	  §4.	  
